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The way in which free movement of people has become the central issue of the 
British government’s renegotiation and referendum campaign on the UK’s 
relationship with the EU risks obfuscating at least three central issues: why 
immigrants are coming to the UK; what impact EU migrants are having on the UK; 
and what can be done to effectively regulate such inflows. It is, however, not just the 
Eurosceptics and the British government but also ‘in campaigners’ and other EU 
member states who risk perpetuating a number of widely-held misconceptions about 
free movement and immigration for political reasons. Buying into such myths risks to 
undermine attempts to have a more honest and more evidence-based debate about 
immigration and migrant integration. 
 





The issue of immigration has dominated much of the political debate in Europe over 
recent years. In most EU Member States that debate has focused on the challenges 
posed by immigrants and asylum-seekers from outside the EU. Contrary to that a lot 
of the discussion in the UK has been about intra-EU migration. When David Cameron 
announced his pledge to hold an in-out referendum on Britain’s European Union 
membership in a speech in January 2013, the issue of the free movement of European 
Union (EU) citizens appeared nowhere on the prime minister’s list of priorities. 
Indeed, in that speech the issue of immigration was not even mentioned. 
 
However, only two months later David Cameron declared immigration, including that 
from inside the EU a top priority: ‘Net migration needs to come down radically from 
hundreds of thousands a year, to just tens of thousands’, thereby responding to the rise 
of the country’s Eurosceptic and anti-immigration United Kingdom Independence 
Party (UKIP).  
 
It is from this point on that the issue of intra-EU migration to the UK started to 
become a significant issue in the context of the country’s EU referendum. There is 
indeed an underlying incompatibility between the EU’s free movement of citizens 
rules, which allow for EU citizens and their family members to move and reside 
freely within the territory of the Member States, and a governmental policy that aims 
to develop policies to constrain immigration. 
 
A number of YouGov polls suggest that this is not only a concern for the country’s 
government, but equally for its citizens. Migration is constantly listed as the most 
important issue facing the nation, and the issue of intra-EU border control and EU 
access to benefits were the most important issues that citizens wanted to see addressed 
in the renegotiation of the UK’s relationship with the EU and it has been shown that 




The issue of migration, and particularly restrictions of so called in-work benefits for 
EU migrants, has become the central issue of the British government’s EU 
renegotiation and referendum campaign. Yet, the current debate across Europe, but 
particularly in Britain, revolves around a number of myths, the propagation of which 
will make it increasingly harder for governments to be responsive to public demands 
about immigration, while at the same time pursue responsible policies on migrant 
integration. 
 
Some of the most relevant of these myths are: (1) that migrants choose destination 
countries predominantly because of their generous welfare benefits; (2) that countries 
like the UK are uniquely and significantly adversely affect by immigration; and (3) 
that restrictive measures can easily and substantially reduce the number of migrants.   
 
While a referendum renegotiation deal based on these assumptions provides some 
necessary but probably not sufficient reassurance for Eurosceptics, it is nonetheless a 
pivotal element for pro-EU campaigners. Supporting the UK/EU deal might secure a 
continued British membership in the EU, but buying into its entailed myths about EU 
migration to the UK, it will be at the cost of continuing an often ill-informed and 
misconceived debate, negatively influencing future political contestation over 
migration. This could provide particularly harmful, as the governance of migration is 
an issue that will continue to be relevant for all developed countries in the future. 
 
In the following, this article provides an overview of migration patterns to the UK and 
to countries with comparable economies. This is followed by a discussion of different 
push and pull factors that lead migrants to come to the UK before outlining why none 
of the proposals currently discussed to restrict immigration are likely to make an 
impact on the numbers arriving. Lastly, the article elaborates on why these scenarios 
may nonetheless determine the outcome of the Brexit referendum.  
 
 
1. EU migration in context: How unique is the UK? 
 
In order to address the commonly-held concern that the UK finds itself in a particular 
strain due to the arrival of intra-EU migrants, a closer look at the available data is 
necessary. While its usage has proven to be a bone of contention in the past, one 
equally needs to note that accurately capturing EU migration figures is difficult. In 
absence of detailed censuses data collection is mainly survey-based and struggles to 
distinguish between different kinds of EU migrants, be they students, workers who 
are temporary posted elsewhere, or permanent migrants. 
 
The simple task of attempting to provide estimates for the number of EU citizens 
residing in the UK and British citizens living in the rest of the European Union proves 
difficult. While Eurostat provides an estimate of 2.6 million EU citizens residing in 
the UK on 1 January 2014, comparable data for UK citizens abroad is not fully 
available. 
 
Accordingly, a very conservative estimate, using data from Eurostat, the OECD, as 
well as a number of member state statistical agencies would place the number of UK 
residents living in the rest of the EU at about 0.9 million. This compares with an 
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estimate of 1.4 million Britons mentioned by David Cameron in his 2013 speech on 
migration, as well as estimates from IPPR. The latter suggest in a 2010 report that 
there may be up to 0.8 million Britons permanently residing in Spain alone, an 
estimate which rises to more than 1 million if one is to include those residing there for 
part of the year. 
	
Given the use of a comparable methodology, Graph 1 provides an overview of the 
proportion of resident migrants compared to the total population in a selected number 
of member states on January 1st 2014 based on Eurostat figures. 
 
With about 8% of its population holding foreign passports, just under half of which 
are EU citizens, the United Kingdom finds itself in a relatively similar position to that 
of other large member states such as Germany or Spain. 
 
Luxembourg, on the other hand, provides for a more extreme case, with 39% of its 
residents holding EU passports. One should of course keep in mind that the relative 
number of foreigners across different Member States are not just determined by the 
relative scale of immigration inflows but also by how liberal or restrictive countries’ 
naturalisation policies are. Some EU member states such as Sweden have 
significantly higher levels of naturalisations (as a proportion of its foreign population) 
than say Luxembourg, with the UK levels at a four per cent average being somewhere 
in between. 
 
Graph 1: Foreigners as a percentage of the total population in select EU countries in 
2014 (Source: Eurostat) 
 
 
The present debate on EU migration to the UK doesn’t only consider the absolute 
stock of migrants, but equally the rise in the number of EU migrants over time. When 
considering Eurostat data detailing the increase of foreign populations across different 
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EU countries since the EU’s 2004 enlargement round (specific data for intra-EU 
migration is not readily available), it is clear that the UK has seen a marked increase 
in the proportion of foreigners in its total population. 
 
Nonetheless, the UK is part of a broader trend of such increases, with countries like 
Belgium and Sweden equally affected. Nonetheless, none of this does compare to a 
very rapid rise in the proportion of foreigners that Spain has experienced in only five 
years until the height of the Eurocrisis. 
 
Furthermore, as UN Population Division data suggests, the development in the UK is 
very similar to that experienced by other developed English-speaking countries like 
Canada, Australia and the US. 
 
When considering more specific UK migration data from the Office of National 
Statistics (based on International Passenger Surveys) that allows to distinguish 
between different categories of migrants, it is important to note that the rise in the 
UK’s foreign population already began in the mid-1990s. Until 2004 non-EU 
immigrants were responsible for virtually all of the increase of the foreign population. 
While there has been a significant rise in the number of EU immigrants to the UK 
since 2004, the non-EU immigrant group is still larger than that from the EU. 
 
It should equally be noted that Germany has experienced an even more pronounced 
rise of EU-immigration since 2008 (according to the German Statistical Office). 
When 2015 data becomes available, its intake of refugees will likely make the country 
stand out further in terms of its foreign population when compared to the UK. 
 
Even when considering the UK as a case apart, there is little evidence for a negative 
impact on the UK’s economy or welfare systems as a result of intra-EU migration.  
 
While a recent study by the Bank of England suggests that immigration into the UK’s 
highly flexible labour market has a small negative impact on overall wage levelsii—
with this effect being more pronounced for unskilled workers—the bulk of the 
evidence shows that the effects of EU migrants on a number of indicators are either 
negligible or indeed beneficial. 
 
For instance, a study by Dustmann and Frattini iii  found that EEA migrants (EU 
countries plus an additional few members of the so called European Economic 
Area)—and unlike non-EU immigrants—have consistently contributed more to the 
UK’s public coffer than they have taken out. The effect was particularly strong when 
only looking at immigration from countries that have joined the EU since 2004. 
 
A 2014 IPPR report assesses a variety of literature on the impact of EU migration on 
the UK’s welfare system and public housing, concluding ‘that public services have 
been able to “cope” with, and even benefit from, high net migration’iv. While the 
same report suggests that an increased population will necessarily impact the housing 
market, EU migrants appear to be less likely to require social housing. Other factors, 
such as the overall development of welfare funding should hence equally be 
considered when trying to account for a strain on the UK’s welfare system. 
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Overall, while it is indeed the case that the UK has seen a considerable increase in the 
number of foreigners, including EU migrants, living in the country, its situation is by 
no means unique. Furthermore, the weight of the evidence suggests that EU migrants 
contribute more to the UK’s public coffers than they take out. Any suggestions that 
the migration patterns to the UK are unique, or that such migration is creating 
unsustainable pressures for the UK welfare system need to be treated with caution. 
 
 
2. Why migrants come to the UK: push and pull factors 
 
One of the key underlying questions of the debate about free movement and 
immigration in the UK context is why migrants come to the country and what could 
be done to better manage, control or reduce migrant inflows.  One often hears that 
migrants are attracted by the UK’s generous welfare system and that curbing this 
‘magnet effect’ of welfare benefits is key to any effort to effectively regulate 
immigration. In his letter to Donald Tusk of 10 November 2015, David Cameron 
made it clear that his government wanted to reduce the numbers of migrants coming 
to the UK and he stated that:  
‘we can reduce the flow of people coming from within the EU by reducing the 
draw that our welfare system can exert across Europe’.   
Academic research, however, has shown that migration dynamics are highly complex 
and that the impact of welfare benefits is often exaggerated. Informing some of the 
most prominent theories of international migration v  is the so-called ‘push–pull 
model’. It is a conceptual framework that emphasizes the interaction of ‘push factors’ 
in countries of origin that cause people to leave their country,vi and ‘pull factors’ that 
attract migrants to certain receiving countries.  
The importance of push factors is particularly clear in the case of forced migration, 
with driving forces ranging from political persecution, poverty, environmental factors 
to natural disasters. vii  It can be shown that the peaks of humanitarian migration 
inflows to Europe in the post-war period have been the direct consequence of the 
major refugee producing conflicts in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq and more recently 
Syria.   
 
To explain over-time variation of intra EU migration flows, economic push-factors 
have played a key role. Labour market disruptions in Eastern Europe after the fall of 
the Iron Curtain or more recently high levels of unemployment in Southern Europe in 
the wake of the global financial crisis are examples of economic push factors that 
have led EU citizens to leave their countries of origin to seek better opportunities 
elsewhere. 
 
This can be expected to be due to two distinct factors that affect economies in 
Southern Europe and those in Eastern Europe in different ways. On the one hand, 
unemployment rates, and specifically youth unemployment have spiraled in Southern 
Europe since the beginning of the financial crisis (Graph 2). This has greatly 
increased incentives for emigration from countries affected in such ways. In 2014, 
more Spanish citizen arrived in the UK than came from Poland that year. While the 
phenomenon does not exist to the same extent in the EU’s new member states, the 
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continuity of low-income levels continues to be a strong push factor in those 
economies. 
 
Graph 2: Youth unemployment rate in the 15-29 years age range in select EU 
countries over time (Source: Eurostat) 
 
  
Such push factors can have a powerful impact on a destination country’s immigration 
system. Their strength will often overwhelm efforts by governments to halt an 
increase in the numbers of arrivals.  
 
While push factors are often crucial for a migrant’s decision to leave their home 
country, it is the variation in pull factors that is widely seen as determining the 
direction of migration flows, i.e. influencing a migrant’s choice of destination 
country.  
 
Structural pull factors often provide powerful explanations of the relative 
attractiveness of destination countries. Some of the most important factors explaining 
the direction of migration flows relate to network effects and economic factors. 
Historical connections, colonial links, language ties or cultural networks between 
countries of origin and destination facilitate transport, trade and communication links 
between countries. In addition, economic migration models explain the decision to 
migrate as one of income maximisation in which wealth differentials and differences 
in employment opportunities constitute important pull factors. viii  Therefore, 
international migration is expected to be determined by geographic differences in the 
supply and demand of labour. On this account, it is wage differentials and 
employment opportunities, which explain movements from low-wage countries to 
higher-wage countries.  Taking these two important structural pull factors together, 
they go a long way in explaining why the UK with its significant historical stocks of 
European migrants from across the continent, its flexible (and English speaking) 
	 7	
labour market, low unemployment and relatively high wages would constitute an 
attractive destination for EU migrants, in particular for those from southern and 
eastern Europe.   
 
Moreover, studies have found that that the impact of differentials in policy restrictions 
relative to variations in structural pull factors, like the ones discussed above, is more 
limited than has sometimes been assumed. A country’s relative restrictiveness in 
terms of its migration relevant policies does not automatically go hand in hand with 
small inflows. Countries can experience high migrant inflows, despite being among 
the countries with the most restrictive policies in Europe. Powerful structural pull 
factors often trump the effects of restrictive deterrence policies. ix 
 
 
3. Restricting Free Movement: Policy Scenarios and their Effectiveness  
 
The question thus arises as to whether the options currently being discussed to address 
the UK’s concerns over high levels of intra-EU migration would be able to 
significantly reduce the UK’s pull factors, and decrease migration levels from the EU. 
Three broad scenarios can be distinguished. The first scenario is the Brexit option 
under which the UK would find itself having to redefine its relations with the rest of 
Europe, the second a British exit from the European Union while remaining part of 
the European Economic Area (EEA), and the third scenario which covers the 
implementation of the reforms resulting from the renegotiations.  
 
The scenario of a British exit from both the EU and the EEA would in theory allow 
the UK to redefine its immigration system. Ultimately, however, the UK’s policy 
choices would nonetheless be heavily constrained not only by business demands for 
both skilled and unskilled labour in a UK labour market that is already characterised 
by very low unemployment. It would also be limited by the fact that there are large 
numbers of UK citizens who will continue to reside in other member states and for 
whom bilateral (and presumably reciprocal) arrangements would have to be found.  
Taking similar considerations into account, Portes has argued that while the UK’s 
immigration policy outside of a continued EU or EEA membership would likely look 
somewhat different to today’s—with migration from the EU being partially replaced 
by migrants from elsewhere—overall net migration levels are unlikely to change.x 
 
The second scenario under which the UK would leave the European Union but remain 
part of the European Economic Area would not provide for a very different situation 
to the current status quo. Just like EEA countries such as Norway, the UK would be 
expected to continue to accept the EU’s freedom of movement rules, albeit losing its 
influence to shape future reforms. This scenario would place the UK in a worse 
situation to the one it finds itself now, where it would have little ability to create 
discrimination between British workers and those from the EEA, nor be able to 
influence the underlying legislation.  
 
The most likely third scenario—which would come into effect if the UK decided to 
remain in the EU—relates to the renegotiation reform package on free movement 




(1) provisions rendering it more difficult for EU citizens to reunite with their 
non-EU national spouses in the UK; 
(2) measures to reduce the amount of child benefits paid to children of EU 
citizens living outside the UK; 
(3) a system that would allow for the temporary restriction of access to in-
work benefits for newly arriving EU citizen workers. 
 
The first and second provisions are expected to have a limited effect. For instance, the 
answer to a parliamentary question revealed that as of 31 March 2015 only 19,579 
children living in the EEA were receiving UK child benefits. Expectations as to the 
third proposal have been portrayed as likely to have a larger impact. Officially 
described as an ‘alert and safeguard mechanism’ for high levels of intra-EU 
migration, it has been nicknamed an ‘emergency brake’ by policy makers and the 
media alike. 
 
As it was agreed ahead of the referendum, a member state would be able to trigger 
this mechanism if there is an ‘inflow of workers from other member States of an 
exceptional magnitude over an extended period of time’, affecting ‘essential aspects 
of its [a member state’s] social security system’ or public services as the underlying 
criteria. While the question remains as to how one would define any of those factors, 
official EU documents suggest that in the case of the deal with the UK this would be 
avoided altogether by simply declaring that such a situation has arisen. This leaves a 
further concern voiced by Steve Peersxi as to the likelihood of the measure being 
struck down by the European Court of Justice. 
 
But even when ignoring these potential pitfalls, would the mechanism, once triggered, 
actually be able to influence the UK’s pull factors? In its agreed form the UK would 
be allowed to restrict access to its in-work benefits for newly arrived workers from 
the EU for a limited period of time, but not for those already residing in the country. 
 
The mechanism hence would not change the incentive structure for the more than 2.6 
million EU citizens who already reside in the UK ahead of the proposed policy 
change, but only for those who may come to seek work in the UK in the future. Nor 
would the mechanism influence new EU migrants’ abilities to seek employment in the 
country as such. Rather, it would only have an effect on their total earnings through 
denying them access to tax- and child benefits. For migrants choosing between 
unemployment at home or work abroad, even reduced benefits might still be expected 
to be a secondary consideration.   
 
When considering the likely effects of restricting access to such benefits, it should be 
noted that for low-income EU workers in the UK without children already at present 
these benefits already only have a small impact on their total incomes. xii  When 
combining this with the low minimum wage in the UK, the overall income potential 
for such workers does not compare favourably to that in several other EU countries. 
 
Furthermore, given that in-work benefits most significantly affect income levels of 
low-paid migrants, it would have less of a potential to alter income-based incentives 
for other categories of EU workers seeking to take up employment in the UK. Any 
direct effect of income-related pull factors for EU-migration to the UK under the 
emergency brake can therefore be expected to be small. 
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Considering the discussion of push and pull factors above, one hence should not 
expect that limited restrictions in the access to benefits will significantly affect intra-
EU migration to the UK.  Not only will the measures be largely inconsequential for 
the large number of EU citizens who come to the UK for other reasons, e.g. to study. 
It is also unlikely to be an important determinant of a migrant’s decision to leave their 
country of origin or their choice of destination country in which they want to work.  
The effects of elements like the overall earnings differential between the UK and 
Eastern European countries, as well as the absence of job prospects across large 
portions of Southern Europe is likely to continue being a more significant determinant 
for those coming to work in the UK. Or, as one the participants at the LSE’s hearing 
on free movement put it: ‘For free market economies the only effective way to reduce 
immigration is to wrack your economy and throw it into recession’. 
 
None of the above scenarios should be expected to be able to significantly help the 
UK government reach its declared net immigration target; while all of them 
simultaneously raise a significant number of practical and economic issues. 
 
 
4. The UK’s migration debate: Short-term politics & long-term risks 
 
The fact that the most likely of the scenarios discussed in the context of Britain’s 
upcoming referendum on EU-membership are not going to significantly change 
migration trends to the UK does not mean that the free movement issue has lost its 
relevance in the wider debate about immigration and Britain’s role in the EU.  
 
With EU immigration and migrant’s access to benefits being the most salient 
renegotiation issues for British citizens, these remain the ones that could ultimately 
determine Britain’s future in the EU. As evidenced by the survey cited at the 
beginning of this article, the question arises whether a renegotiation deal taking into 
account only the discussed elements could actually help determine the outcome of the 
referendum. While opinion polls on the referendum currently see the in-votes and the 
out-votes closely tied, polls have suggested that those numbers could be influenced 
significantly by how the outcome of the renegotiation deal is presented.xiii 
 
A debate that focuses on immigration restrictions (irrespective of how desirable or 
feasible those are) is politically convenient for both, supporters of Brexit, as well as 
those hoping for a continued British membership in the EU. Those favouring Brexit 
can argue that the proposed restrictions for EU migrants are too little too late to 
effectively curb such migration to the UK as demanded in David Cameron’s original 
letter to Donald Tusk. 
 
On the other side, pro-EU campaigners are able to claim that the right kind of package 
of restrictions will allow the government to address key concerns about EU migration, 
namely to limit EU migrants’ access to benefits and stop what the Prime Minister has 
referred to as the problem of ‘benefit tourism’.  This is in line with a body of literature 
that suggests that rather than following public opinion or scientific evidence, 
immigration policy is often based on a tough rhetoric and symbolic reforms to 
appease the general public, while ultimately following other policy goals.xiv 
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However, there is a pressing need for a more honest and more evidence-based debate 
about immigration in the UK.  Politicians from across the political spectrum as well as 
a large part of the media share a certain responsibility for muddying the waters of the 
migration debate. The UK’s misguided debate has been fuelled in particular by those 
who have indulged in alarmist rhetoric about the threats of immigration to population 
growth, who have set arbitrary and unachievable objectives (such as the UK’s net 
immigration target) and who have made the case for immigration restrictions on the 
basis of questionable figures (e.g. the government’s claims on the proportion of EU 
citizens claiming welfare benefits) that were subsequently criticised by the 
Government’s own watchdog, the UK Statistics Authority which referred to the way 
these figures were released as ‘disappointing’, ‘unsatisfactory’ and at risk of 
undermining public confidence.xv   
 
The current debate risks perpetuating a number of myths about free movement and 
immigration: the myth that that welfare benefits are the principal attraction for 
migrants’ choice of destination country and that EU migrants constitute a drain on the 
UK’s benefits system; that the UK would be better off with significantly less 
migration from other parts of the EU; or that restrictive policy measures can act like a 
tap to increase or decrease immigration. 
 
Moreover, the often highly emotive debate on immigration in the UK has also 
resulted in the fact that there is a wide gap between the public’s general concerns 
about migration, which does not correlate with individuals’ personal concerns. While 
immigration is perceived as the most important issue facing the nation, when asked 
what issues are relevant for oneself and ones’ family, immigration comes in fourth, 
after the economy and health, and at a similar level as pensions in YouGov polls. As 
Dannison and Goodwin have pointed out, while there is a long-established anti-
immigration feeling, the perceived importance of the issue is highly volatile in the 
British context in the long termxvi. This is not to say that public concerns about 
migration should be ignored. To the contrary, a continued mismatch between 
unrealistic immigration policies and public concerns that are not effectively addressed 
is likely to further erode public confidence.  
 
A more honest and more evidence-based debate about immigration is clearly needed.  
A first step in that direction would be to recognize the political expediencies of the 
current debate that frequently acts as a convenient distraction from other issues such 
as wider concerns about the loss of national sovereignty. The alternative is to continue 
the current debate that risks vilifying migrants, that often misrepresents their 
motivations for leaving their home countries, while also undermining their prospect 
for integration. And at the same time to continue fueling the smokescreen of 
exaggerated concerns about intra-EU migration while we continue to stand on the 
sidelines of urgent efforts to deal with Europe’s wider migration challenges.   																																																									
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